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RENEWING THE CALL: IMMIGRANTS' 
RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL IN 
DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS 
BETH J. WERLIN* 
DepfJrlation is a significant deprivation of liberty-both scholars and 
courts have likened it to criminal punishment. In fact, with the passage of 
the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigration Reform Act in 1996, Con-
gress expanded the grounds for deportation while narrowing the avenues 
for relief. Moreover, immigration law is notoriously complex, as are the de-
pfJrlation proceedings themselves. These adjudicatory hearings incorporate 
many of the formal procedural protections adopted by courts of law. Yet 
non-citizens, who often have little understanding of the American legal sys-
tem, have no right to appointed counsel. In light of the significant interests 
at stake, the complexity of the process, and the evolving nature of the law, 
the right to appointed counsel is necessary to ensure that the dictates of due 
process are satisfied. 
For immigrants facing a deportation hearing, the stakes are 
high. l Deportation could mean being separated from their families 
and friends and being forced to quit their jobs and to leave their 
homes. It could mean being sent to a foreign country where unfamil-
iar faces or even physical harm await them. It could even mean that 
they will never be able to return to the United States.2 
Once an immigrant is served with a notice to appear, which in-
forms a non-citizen that deportation proceedings have been initiated, 
all that stands between him and deportation is the deportation pro-
ceeding itself. !I This hearing is his opportunity to defend himself 
against the charge that he is deportable or to demonstrate that he is 
eligible for some form of relief from deportation.4 However, the de-
portation proceeding is a confusing and threatening process, particu-
* Senior Articles Editor, BOSTON COlLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL (1999-2000). 
1 See infra Part II. 
2 See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. 1182 (1998). This 
Note will use the INA citations since the statutes referred to herein are all found within the 
INA. See also infra note 138 and accompanying text. 
S See INA §§ 239, 240(a). A notice to appear initiates the deportation proceeding 
against a non·dtizen. See ill. § 239(a). The notice lists the charges against the non-citizen 
and informs him of the time and place of the proceeding. See id. 
4 See ill. § 240. 
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lady for a non-citizen, with limited knowledge of immigration law, 
who is subject to interrogation by an Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (Service or INS) attorney and the Immigration Judge (1]), 
and who is unsure of what evidence to offer and how to meet the legal 
burdens of proof.5 Thus, the deportation proceedings fail to ade-
quately protect the significant interests of unrepresented immigrants. 
For thirty years, scholars have written about the value of ap-
pointed counsel. In his 1975 article, Robert N. Black stated that due 
process required the government to assign counsel to indigent non-
citizens in deportation proceedings.6 Black employed a due process 
analysis that balanced the interests of the non-citizen and the non-
citizen's ability to represent himself adequately against the weight of 
the government's interest in not providing counseI.7 He recognized 
the "recent evolution of the due process concept"8 and modeled his 
analysis on the newly-developed tests utilized by courts to determine if 
due process required appointed counsel in other government-
initiated civil proceedings.9 He then concluded that due process re-
quires appointed counsel for certain classes of deportation caseslO be-
cause a non-citizen's interests can be so significant that "counsel is 
needed for the individual to be heard in a meaningful way. "11 
That same year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit ruled on the issue of appointed counsel for deportees. I2 In 
AlJUilera-Ennquez v. INS, the court did not adopt Black's due process 
analysis.I3 Instead, the court decided that the determination of 
whether a non-citizen has a due process right to appointed counsel 
requires a case-by-case analysis.I4 In this particular case, the court 
found that due process did not require appointed counsel. I5 
5 See infra Part III. 
6 See Robert N. Black, Due Process and Deportation-Is There a Right to Assigned Counsel? 8 
V.C. DAVIS L. REv. 289, 296-308. Black's conception of the right to appointed counsel is 
not absolute. See id. at 305-Q8. Certain classes of non-citizens, such as non-immigrants not 
asserting citizenship or asylum seekers, would not be afforded this right. See id. at 305-Q6. 
7 See id. at 299-300. 
8 Id. at 308; see also infra Part I. 
9 See Black, supra note 6, at 299-304. 
10 See id. at 304. 
II Id. at 304, 308. 
12 See generally Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975); infra notes 79-83 
and accompanying text. 
I! See Aguilera-Enriquez, 516 F.2d at 568-69. 
14 See id. 
15 See id. at 569. 
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Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue 
specifically, the circuit courts have uniformly applied the case-by-case 
standard as set out in Aguilera-Enriquez and have rejected a per se right 
to appointed counsel in deportation proceedings. I6 The application 
of this standard has denied appointed counsel to non-citizens in 
nearly every case,I7 Nevertheless, scholarship on the topic has contin-
ued to argue for extending the right to appointed counsel to non-
citizens in deportation proceedings. IS Generally, these arguments 
point out that assigned counsel in deportation proceedings is consis-
tent with contemporary notions of procedural due process as set out 
in Mathews v. Eldridge. I9 
Recent amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA) have made the legal arguments in favor of appointed counsel 
stronger and of greater importance to those whom it would benefit. 
In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigra-
tion Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).2o The IIRIRA expanded the grounds 
for deportation, the bars to relief, and the bars to re-entry.21 Further-
more, many of these provisions apply retroactively.22 The increased 
harshness of these changes to the INA means that non-citizens, par-
ticularly immigrants,23 have increased stakes in the deportation pro-
ceeding, and thus an increased need for representation. 
16 See infra note 84. 
17 See infra note 85. 
18 See, e.g., David A. Robertson, An opportunity to Be Heard: The Right to Counsel in a De-
portation Hearing, 63 WASH L. REv. 1019,1040 (1988); William L. Dick,Jr., Note, The Right 
to Appointed Counsel for Indigent Civil Litigants: The Demands of Due Process, 30 WM. & MARY L. 
REv. 627, 628 (1989); Elizabeth Glazer, Note, The Right to Appointed Counsel in Asylum Pro-
ceedings, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1157, 1157-58 (1985). Like Black, these authors set limits as to 
which classes of non-citizens have interests great enough to warrant this protection. See 
Black, supra note 6, at 305-08; Robertson, supra, at 1050; Dick, supra, at 628; Glazer, supra, 
at 1157-58. 
19 See Black, supra note 6, at 305-08; Robertson, supra note 18, at 1050; Dick, supra note 
18, at 628; Glazer, supra note 18, at 1157-58; see alm 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). For a discus-
sion of the Court's holding in Mathews, see infra notes 147-51 and accompanying text. 
20 Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, Pub L. No. 104-208, 
110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C) [hereinafter llRIRAJ. 
Instead of referring to the United States Code citation, throughout this Note, I will cite to 
the corresponding section of the INA. 
21 See infra Part II.B. 
22 See INA § 321 (c); infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text. 
23 In general, non-citizens (any person who is not a citizen or national of the United 
States) can be divided into two categories: immigrants and non-immigrants. See INA 
§ 101 (a) (15). Immigrants are defined negatively in the INA: all non-citizens who do not fit 
into one of the specified non-immigrant categories are immigrants. See id. Non-immigrants 
are usually allowed to enter the United States for only a limited amount of time and for a 
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This Note demonstrates that the arguments in favor of a per se 
right to appointed counsel for immigrants in deportation proceedings 
are even more persuasive today than they have been in the past.24 Part 
I describes the development of due process rights, particularly with 
regard to counsel, for non-citizens whom the Service has placed in 
deportation proceedings. This part focuses on the influence of devel-
opments in other fields of law on the current status of appointed 
counsel in deportation. 
Parts II and III employ the Mathews balancing test25-the Su-
preme Court's weighing of interests to determine what procedural 
protections are required by due process-to demonstrate that the ab-
sence of counsel i~ deportation proceedings results in a hearing that 
is fundamentally unfair. Part II analyzes the immigrant's liberty inter-
ests at stake in deportation, focusing on how changes to the INA 
made by the IIRIRA have affected these interests. Part III argues that 
the existing procedures fail to protect against erroneous deprivations 
of liberty. This is due in part to the complexity of immigration law and 
procedures, but also to the adversarial nature of the proceeding and 
to the Immigration Judges' precarious role as both adjudicator and 
inquisitor. Furthermore, Part III shows that changes to the INA, 
though limiting the defenses available to non-citizens and removing 
specific reason. See, e.g., id. § 101 (a) (15) (B), (K). For example, non-immigrants can come 
to the United States to attend school, to conduct business, or to visit relatives. See id. 
§ 101 (a) (15)(B), (F). 
Immigrants, however, generally intend to remain in the United States. See id. § 201 (a). 
Upon admission, most immigrants attain the status of legal permanent resident (LPR) , are 
able to work, and are eligible for some government benefits. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, 
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAw AND POLICY 99 (2d ed. 1997). In 1998, 660, 477 immi-
grants were admitted to the United States. See Office of Policy and Planning, Statistics 
Branch, Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Dept. of Justice, No.2, Legal Immi-
gration, Fiscal Year 1998, at 7 (May 1999) [hereinafter Legal Immigration]. Of this number, 
72% were family-sponsored immigrants (family preference immigrants and immediate 
relative immigrants). See id. They were admitted to the United States because they have 
relatives who are citizens or LPRs. See INA §§ 203(a), 204(a), (c), (f), (g), (h). About 8% of 
the immigrants were refugees, almost 12% came because of an employment offer, and 
about 7% came as part of a diversity program. See Legal Immigration, supra, at 7. 
24 The 1996 changes to the INA abolished the term "deportation proceedings." See 
LEGOMSKY, supra note 23, at 534. The term "removal proceedings" was added to encom-
pass both deportation and exclusion (now called "inadmissibility"). See id. Removal pro-
ceedings adjudicate non-citizens whom the Service wants to remove either because they 
are deportable or because they are inadmissible. See id. However, for purposes of this arti-
cle, I will use the terms "deportation" and "deportation proceedings" in order to distin-
guish between the removal of non-citizens because they are deportable and the removal of 
non-citizens because they are inadmissible. 
25 See 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
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some of the IJ's discretion, in fact actually increase the need for coun-
sel. This Note concludes that in light of immigrants' strong interests 
in remaining in the United States and the potential for erroneously 
depriving them of that interest, the case-by-case approach to deter-
mining if counsel must be appointed fails to meet the dictates of due 
process. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE-By-CASE APPROACH 
Regardless of the judiciary'S recognition of the penal and quasi-
criminal nature of deportation,26 the Supreme Court has held repeat-
edly that deportation proceedings are civil rather than criminal in 
nature.27 This distinction is important because the constitutional pro-
tections afforded criminal defendants, including the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel, are, therefore, not available to non-citizens in 
deportation proceedings.28 
Nevertheless, non-citizens in deportation proceedings do have 
some constitutional protections. The courts have differentiated be-
tween Congress' authority to dictate conditions for non-citizens resid-
ing in the United States and Congress' prescribing procedure for en-
forcing and adjudicating these conditions.29 With regard to the 
former power, non-citizens are "subject to the power of Congress to 
expel them, or order them to be removed and deported from the 
country, whenever, in its judgment, their removal is necessary or ex-
pedient for the public interest. "30 This virtually unreviewable power to 
establish conditions for non-citizens consistently has been reaffirmed 
by the Supreme Court. 31 
26 See infra note 90. 
27 See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 
U.S. 135, 154 (1945). 
28 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See also, e.g., Galvan v. Press 347 U.S. 522, 531 
(1954) (prohibition against ex-post facto laws not applicable). However, even in the case of 
retroactive legislation, which has long been accepted in the civil context, due process ar-
guments have been made against their applicability in deportation proceedings. See Nancy 
Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 97, 97 (1998). Although Morawetz acknowledges that the legislature can proscribe 
retroactive immigration laws, she suggests that recent retroactive legislation, particularly 
with regard to aggravated felons, is not justifiable and violates due process. See id. at 97-98, 
100. 
29 SeeYamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903). 
30 Fong Vue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893); see Chae Chan Ping v. 
United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (finding that political branch has exclusive control of 
sovereign power to regulate immigration). 
31 See, e.g., Harisiadesv. Shaughnessy, 342 US 580, 588-90 (1952). 
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Congress, however, is limited in its authority to dictate the proce-
dure for enforcing immigration laws. In 1903, the Supreme Court 
recognized a non-citizen's Fifth Amendment right to procedural due 
process in deportation proceedings.32 In Yamataya v. Fisher ("The 
Japanese Immigrant Case"), the Court stated that "this [Supreme 
Court] has never held that administrative officers, when executing the 
provisions of a statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard 
the fundamental principles that inhere in 'due process of law' as un-
derstood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution."33 In princi-
ple, the Court's commitment to the Fifth Amendment was strong and 
explicit, but in practice, the due process rhetoric has proven hollow.34 
Even in Yamataya, where the Court acknowledged that a non-citizen 
must be given the opportunity to be heard prior to determining that 
he is deportable, the protection afforded the non-citizen was mini-
maps For example, due process did not require an interpreter for the 
non-citizen; thus, in effect, the opportunity to be heard was granted 
only to those who understood and spoke English.36 
With a few exceptions,37 Yamataya's due process rhetoric contin-
ued to lack substance for the next fifty years.38 However, as pointed 
out by immigration lawyer Charles Gordon in 1961, "due process is an 
expanding concept which reflects current notions of fairness. "39 
Changing notions of fairness were reflected in the Immigration and 
However, even with regard to issues that are clearly substantive in nature, there are 
some narrow limitations to Congress' power. For example, in Francis v. INS, the court en-
tertained an equal protection challenge to a provision that offered relief to certain classes 
of non·dtizens while denying it to others. See 532 F.2d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1976). Using a 
minimum scrutiny standard, the court found that the standards for eligibility were not fair 
and not substantially related to the object of the legislation. See id. at 272-73. 
Furthermore, Hiroshi Motomura argues that the development of due process protec-
tions available to immigrants has effectively brought substantive due process into immigra-
tion law as well. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural 
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1625, 1656-1704 (1992). 
32 See Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100. 
33Id. 
34 See id. 100-02. 
35 Seeid. at 101-02. 
36 See id. 
37 There were several cases that did in fact look at the entire procedure to determine if 
the non·dtizen had been afforded due process. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 F. 745, 
749 (8th Cir. 1915); Ex Parte Chin Loy You, 223 F. 833, 837-39 (D. Mass. 1915). 
38 See Motomura, supra note 31, at 1638-44; David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership 
in the National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L. REv. 165, 174-75 
(1983). 
39 Charles Gordon, Right to Counsel in Immigration Proceedings, 45 MINN. L. REv. 875, 
879 (1961). 
-- --------------
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Nationality Act of 1952.40 The new statutory procedures replaced the 
loose procedural protections previously required by the Constitu-
tion.41 Among the protections provided in the statute, an alien in de-
portation proceedings had a right to an attorney "at no expense to 
the government. "42 
The legal climate of the 1960s made possible challenges to the 
constitutionality of the provision "at no expense to the government" 
through arguments that due process required assignment of counsel 
to indigent non-citizens. In 1963, the Supreme Court established a 
right to appointed counsel in criminal cases in Gideon v. Wainwright.43 
Adopting language from a prior case involving the right to counsel in 
criminal cases, the Supreme Court in Gideon stated: 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail 
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. 
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and 
sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with 
crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself 
whether the indictment is good or bad. 
He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to pre-
pare his defense, even though he have [sic] a perfect one. 
He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the 
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, 
he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know 
how to establish his innocence.44 
40 See Immigration and Naturalization Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, § 242 
(1952). , 
41 See id. §§ 242, 292. However, there were increased procedural protections after 1950 
when the Supreme Court decided Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950), which 
held that the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) was applicable to deportation proceed-
ings. See Sidney B. Rawitz, From Wong Yang Sung to Black Robes, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 
453,456, May 2, 1998. Congress subsequently exempted the Service from having to con-
form with the APA. See id. at 457. 
42 Currently, this provision states: "the alien shall have the privilege of being repre-
sented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien's choosing who is 
authorized to practice in such proceedings [.] " INA § 240 (b) ( 4) (A) . 
43 See 372 U.S. 335, 342, 345 (1963). The Court agreed with the defendant that the ap-
pointment of counsel is a fundamental right essential to a fair trial. See id. at 344-45 (over-
ruling Betts v. Brady, 316 US 455 (1942». Therefore, the Sixth Amendment guarantee of 
counsel for indigent defendants was extended to the states via the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See id. at 342. 
44 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932». 
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Although the Sixth Amendment did not apply to deportation 
proceedings, the reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court in Gideon 
lends support to a right to appointed counsel under the Fifth 
Amendment since both Amendments encompass underlying con-
cerns about fairness.45 
More importantly, in 1967, the right to appointed counsel made 
its way into the civil context.46 In In re Gault; the Supreme Court rec-
ognized a juvenile's due process right to appointed counsel in delin-
quency proceedings.47 In its opinion, the Court focused on the char-
acteristics of the proceeding rather than its label as "civil" or 
"administrative."48 Regardless of the juvenile justice system's attempts 
to make the delinquency proceedings less adversarial than an adult 
criminal trial and more focused on the welfare of the child, in Gault, 
the Court recognized that the consequences of a delinquency hearing 
would be essentially the same as in a criminal trial.49 The fact that the 
juvenile's physical liberty was at stake was integral in the Court's deci-
sion.5o 
In contrast to Gault, the Court has been less willing to recognize 
an absolute right to appointed counsel where the deprivation of lib-
erty is non-physical.51 For example, in Lassiter v. Department of Social 
Services, the Court rejected the argument that due process required 
appointed counsel for indigent parents in proceedings to terminate 
their parental rights.52 
45 See William Haney, Deportation and the Right to Counsel, 11 HARv. INT'L LJ. 177, 184-
85 (1970). 
46 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,41-42 (1967); see also Robert S. Catz & Nancy Lee Frank, 
The Right to Appointed Counsel in Q:.tasi-Criminal Cases: Towards an Effective Assistance of Coun-
sel Standard, 19 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 397, 410 (1984). Interestingly, around this same 
time, the Supreme Court was also expanding the protections afforded criminal defendants 
beyond the right to counsel. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966). 
47 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41. Like deportation proceedings, delinquency proceedings 
are civil, not criminal, hearings. See supra note 28; Catz & Frank, supra note 46, at 399-400. 
Some commentators refer to these proceedings as "quasi-<:riminal." See id. 
46 See In re Gault, at 38-42; Catz & Frank, supra note 46, at 410. 
49 See Catz & Frank, supra note 46, at 410; Haney, supra note 45, at 184-85. 
50 SeeCatz & Frank, supra note 46, at 410; Haney, supra note 45, at 184-85. 
A year later, in Heryford v. Parker, the Tenth Circuit extended In re Gault to civil com-
mitments. See 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968). Like in In re Gault, the court focused on 
the fact that physical liberty was at stake. See id.; In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41. That the depri-
vation of freedom was necessary to administer treatment rather than punish the individual 
did not matter. See Heryford, 396 F.2d at 396; Catz & Frank, supra note 46, at 411. 
51 See Catz & Frank, supra note 46, at 415. 
52 452 U.S. 18 (1981). The right to appointed counsel diminished as the liberty inter-
est diminished. See id. at 26; see also Catz & Frank, supra note 46, at 417. 
2000] Appointed Counsel in Deportation Hearings 401 
Prior to Gault, there had been attempts to argue that non-citizens 
in deportation proceedings were entitled to appointed counsel,53 
However, courts generally declined to decide the issue of whether due 
process required appointed counsel. Instead, they found that the ab-
sence of counsel was not prejudicial in those cases.54 Mter 1967, how-
ever, academia encouraged courts to apply the "intellectual frame-
work" of Gault to determine if counsel should be provided in 
deportation proceedings. 55 A parallel argument was drawn between 
the deprivation of liberty at stake in a juvenile delinquency hearing 
and the deprivation of liberty at stake in a deportation hearing.56 It 
was argued that 
The consequences of deportation are often fully as grave as 
those of imprisonment; deportation has at times had the ef-
fect of wrenching a person from his home since childhood, 
separating him from his wife and children, who may be 
American citizens, and sending him to a strange land or, 
even worse, leaving him with no country at all to which to 
turn.57 
However, when the Sixth Circuit rendered its decision in Aguilera-
Enriquez, rather than relying on Gault, the court looked to Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli'S and its predecessor, Morrissey v. Brewer,59 for guidance.6o Gag-
non, a post-Warren decision handed down in 1973, was a case in which 
the petitioner,John Gagnon, had had his probation revoked without a 
hearing.61 On habeas review, the Supreme Court held that a probation 
revocation, like a parole revocation, is not a criminal proceeding; 
nonetheless, it does result in a deprivation of liberty, and thus entitles 
53 See, e.g., De Bernardo v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 81, 82 (D.C. Cir. 1958); In re Raimondi, 126 
F. Supp. 390, 391, 395 (N.D. Cal. 1954). 
54 See, e.g., De Bernardo, 254 F.2d at 82; Raimondi, 126 F. Supp. at 395. In Henriques v. 
INS, the court rejected the petitioner's claim that he was entitled to appointed counsel, 
reasoning that counsel would not have been able to obtain a different outcome for the 
petitioner in the deportation proceeding. 465 F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 1972). However, the 
court declined to address the issue of whether counsel would be required in certain cases 
calling that a "grave" question that would best be left for another time. See id. at 121. 
55 See Haney, supra note 45, at 184. 
56 See id. at 185. 
57 See id. (citing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) and Shaughnessy v. 
U.S. ex reI. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953». 
58 411 U.S. 778 (1973). 
59 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
60 See Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565,568 & n.3 (6th Cir. 1965). 
61 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 780 (1973). 
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a probationer to due process.62 Due process entitles a probationer to a 
hearing before his probation is revoked.63 
More importantly, in Gagnon, the Court addressed the issue of 
whether the government was obligated to appoint counsel to repre-
sent probationers in revocation hearings.64 Instead of adopting a per 
se rule akin to the right to appointed counsel in criminal proceed-
ings65 or in juvenile delinquency hearings,66 the Court adopted a "case 
by case" approach.67 Essentially, under this approach, the court would 
consider the peculiarities of a particular case to determine if counsel 
was necessary.68 
In adopting this approach, the Court reasoned that the "nature" 
of the revocation proceeding would be significantly, and detrimen-
tally, altered if counsel were provided for the probationer.69 Probation 
revocation hearings are informal and flexible-the technical rules of 
procedure and evidence do not apply.70 Furthermore, the State is rep-
resented by a probation officer, not a prosecutor.71 The probation 
officer, while not wanting to compromise public safety, is responsible 
for furthering the rehabilitative goals of the probation system.72 The 
Court feared that the introduction of counsel into the revocation 
proceeding might prevent the hearing body from staying "attuned to 
the rehabilitative needs of the individual probationer .... "73 The 
Court was concerned that this relatively non-adversarial proceeding 
would become unnecessarily adversarial and lose the benefits of in-
formality and flexibility.74 
Although the Court did seem concerned with the probationer's 
best interest, the decision in Gagnon gave little weight to the liberty 
62 See id. at 782. Gagnon had pleaded guilty to armed robbery and was placed on pro-
bation for seven years. See id. at 779. 
63 Seeid. at 782-83, 790; Morrisseyv. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480-82 (1972). 
64 See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787-90. 
65 See generally, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
66 See In reGault, 387 U.S. 1,41 (1967). 
67 See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 788-89. In doing so, the Court adopted an approach similar 
to that of the right to counsel in felony prosecutions in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
See id. The court acknowledged the fact that this approach was rejected in Gideon, but 
maintained that the differences between criminal trials and probation revocation hearings 
was substantial enough that the case-by-case approach is not necessarily inadequate. See id. 
66 See id. at 789. 
69 See id. at 787-88. 
70 See id. at 789 
71 See id. 
72 See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787-89. 
73 See id. at 787-88. 
74 See id.; see also Black, supra note 6, at 295. 
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interests at stake in probation revocation hearings.75 Several states 
have recognized a right to appointed counsel in probation revocation 
proceedings in their own criminal justice systems.76 The Massachusetts 
courts, for example, have held that counsel is necessary in a proba-
tion revocation hearing because of the liberty interest at stake.77 In 
1966, the highest court in Massachusetts explained the link between 
the right to appointed counsel and this liberty interest: 
The defendant's liberty is at stake, and at this point in the 
process of sentencing as much as at any other point he has 
need of counsel. In this case the decision on the petitioner's 
liberty is still in the hands of the sentencing court. . . . [I] n 
the absence of a waiver [the probationer must] be afforded 
counsel at a probation revocation hearing where such revo-
cation might result in imprisonment. It is based on simple 
justice. 78 
Nonetheless, quoting from Gagnon, the Aguilera-Enriquez court 
held that "[t]he test for whether due process requires the appoint-
ment of counsel for an indigent alien is whether, in a given case, the 
assistance of counsel would be necessary to provide 'fundamental 
fairness, the touchstone of due process. "'79 The court went on to as-
sess the merits of the petitioner's case.80 The petitioner was deport-
able because he had been convicted of a narcotics offense.81 Looking 
to the record established before the Immigration Judge, the court 
concluded that the petitioner had raised no defense to the charge 
that he was deportable.82 Consequently, the court found that "counsel 
75 See generally Gagnon, 411 U.S. 778. 
76 See, e.g., Williams v. Commonwealth, 216 N.E.2d 779, 782-83 (1966). In addition to 
Massachusetts, states that recognize the right to the assistance of counsel at a probation 
revocation hearing include: Arizona, California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Mary-
land, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, and Texas. See44A.L.R. 3d 306, § 4(a) (Supp.1998). 
77 See Williams, 216 N.E.2d at 782-83; see also Commonwealth v. Faulkner, 638 N.E.2d. 
1,5 (1994) (reaffirming the holding in Williams). 
78 Williams, 216 N.E.2d at 782-83. 
79 Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 568 (6th Cir. 1975) (quoting ,Gagnon, 411 
U.S. at 790). 
80 See id. at 569. 
81 See id. 
82 See id. It is important to note the procedural history of this case. The petitioner had 
requested counsel at his administrative hearing before an Immigration Judge. See id. at 
567. The ij' refused his request, and the petitioner was ordered deported. See id. The peti-
tioner appealed the Il's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals. See id. at 568. The 
Board dismissed his appeal and the petitioner then sought review in the federal court. See 
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could have obtained no different administrative result" and, thus, re-
jected the petitioner's claim that he was denied due process.83 
Cases subsequent to Aguilera-Enriquez have followed the Sixth Cir-
cuit.84 Like the Aguilera-Enriquez court, other circuits are generally 
quick to find that a non-citizen's lack of representation was not preju-
dicial to the outcome.85 In practice, the case-by-case approach has es-
sentially resulted in across-the-board denials of appointed counsel. 
I. THE LIBERTY INTEREST 
Less than two years after the Aguilera-Enriquez court cited funda-
mental fairness as the touchstone of due process,86 the Supreme 
Court adopted explicit guidelines for determining what constitutes 
fundamental fairness.s7 In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court held that: 
the specific dictates of due process generally requires [sic] 
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private in-
terest that will be affected by the official action; second, the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of addi-
tional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government's interest, including the function involved and 
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail,88 
In applying the Mathews balancing test to the question of whether ap-
pointed counsel for immigrants in deportation proceedings is re-
quired, it is necessary to identifY each of the three factors set out 
id. The only issue before the Sixth Circuit was whether the petitioner had a constitutionally 
protected right to appointed counsel. See id. 
83 See id. at 569. 
84 See, e.g., Cyrulik v. INS, NO. 92-70183, 1993 WL 98817, at *3 (9th Cir. Apr. 2, 1993) 
(unpublished opinion) ("Cyrulik has failed to show how counsel's assistance in eliciting 
Cyrulik's full testimony or cross-examining certain documents would have altered the out-
come of the hearing."); Michelson v. INS, 897 F.2d 465, 468 (10th Cir. 
1990) ("[P]etitioner's complaint concerning the lack of appointed counsel does not pro-
vide a valid ground for challenging the order of deportation because he has not shown 
prejudice which would cast doubt on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding."). 
85 See Cyrulik, 1993 WL 98817, at *3; Michelson, 897 F.2d at 468. But see Rios-Berrios v. 
INS, 776 F.2d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding "serious doubts" as to voluntariness of de-
fendant's waiver of voluntary departure and holding that it was "convinced that his asylum 
case [would] be more advantageously presented by retained counsel"). 
86 See 516 F.2d at 568. 
87 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 313,335 (1976). 
88 [d. 
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above and balance each one's strengths in relation to the others.89 
This Part will analyze the first factor: the effect of the government's 
action of deportation on the immigrant's private interests. 
A. Departation as Banishment, Exile, and Worse 
Scholars and courts have recognized the gravity of deportation, 
and likened it to criminal punishment.9o In defining the private inter-
est at stake in deportation proceedings, consideration of these grave 
consequences is necessary.91 For many long-time legal permanent 
residents, returning to their home country is like sending them to live 
in a foreign country. Many immigrants come to the United States as 
children,92 and some may not remember living in any other country; 
others simply have not returned to their native country for ~any 
years. Friends and family often live in the United States, and immi-
grants' familial ties to their homeland may be minima1.93 
Some immigrants find that deportation is not only analogous to 
criminal punishment, but that in fact, it will result in physical harm to 
them.94 Immigrants who are refugees95 may be killed, imprisoned or 
forced to suffer another form of persecution if they are deported.96 
89 See id. 
90 See, e.g., Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy 374 U.S. 469, 479 (1963) ("deportation is a 
drastic sanction, one which can destroy lives and disrupt families"); Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 
6,10 (1948) ("deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment 
of [sic] exile"); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) ("Though deportation is not 
technically a criminal proceeding it visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives 
him of the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom. That deportation is a 
penalty-at times a most serious one-<annot be doubted."); Morawetz, supra note 28, at 
102. Morawetz goes so far as calling on the courts to "wipe the slate clean and admit to the 
long evident reality that deportation is punishment." See id. 
91 See Black, supra note 6, at 300-01; Glazer, supra note 18, at 1179-80. 
92 In 1998, 129,291 immigrants-about 20% of the total admitted to the country that 
year-were under 15 years old. See Legal Immigration, supra note 23, at 10. 
93 More than two-thirds of all immigrants admitted to the United States in 1998 were 
family-sponsored. See Legal Immigration, supra note 23, at 7. Furthermore, any child born in 
the United States is a U.S. citizen regardless of his parent's citizenship. See INA § 301 (a). 
94 See INA § 101 (a) (42). Refugees come to the United States because of persecution in 
their native country. See id.; see also infra note 96. 
95 The term "refugee" incorporates two groups: refugees, those who make claims from 
outside of the United States, and asylees, those who make claims once in the United States. 
SeeINA§§ 101 (a)(42) , 207(c) , and 208 (b) (1). 
96 See Glazer, supra note 18, at 1179-80. Refugees are admitted to the United States be-
cause they either have been persecuted or have a well-founded fear of being persecuted on 
one of five grounds specified. See INA § 101 (a) (42). To qualify as a refugee, the non-citizen 
must show that the persecution or well-founded fear of persecution was on account of his 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. See 
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Furthermore, because the statutory grounds for asylum are narrow-
not all persecuted persons are eligible for asylum-many non-citizens 
who would face persecution upon return to their native country may 
have emigrated to the United States without seeking asylum.97 
Regardless of whether the immigrant is a long-time resident or 
he fears persecution upon return to his country of origin, he has an 
interest in remaining in the United States. Immigrants by their very 
nature have a significant private interest; they have left their homes, 
moved to a foreign country, and started anew with an intent to remain 
in the United States.98 As one commentator has pointed out, "[l]awful 
permanent resident aliens occupy the circle of membership [in soci-
ety] just outside that of citizens, and resident aliens have developed a 
substantial stake in the community in justifiable reliance on their con-
tinued rights in this society. ''99 Consequently, even those immigrants 
with relatively few quantifiable private interests at stake still face 
significant deprivations ifthey are deported. lOO 
Congress, recognizing the private interests at stake in deportation 
proceedings, has passed legislation that renders some immigrants 
statutorily eligible for relief from deportation. lOl Historically, the relief 
id. There are several statutory bars to asylum including participation in persecution, the 
commission of a serious non-political crime outside of the United States, and the convic-
tion for a serious crime inside the United States. See INA § 208(a)-(b). 
97 See supra note 96. 
98 See supra note 23. Although immigrants, unlike non-immigrants, may remain in the 
United States permanently, they may be deported if they fall within the grounds for de-
portability. See INA § 237(a). For immigrants, the greatest concern is that they will be 
found deportable on criminal- or security-related grounds which include: the conviction of 
one crime of moral turpitude committed within five years after the date of admission and 
for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed; the conviction of two crimes 
of moral turpitude; the conviction of an aggravated felony; the conviction of a crime re-
lated to high-speed flight from an immigration checkpoint; the conviction under a law 
relating to a controlled substance; the conviction of firearm offense; the conviction of a 
crime of domestic violence; stalking; or child abuse, neglect, or abandonment; and the 
violation ofa protection order. See INA § 237(a) (2) (scattered sections). 
In addition, an immigrant is deportable if he was a drug abuser or addict, committed 
document fraud or marriage fraud, voted unlawfully, became a public charge, failed to 
properly register under non-citizen registration laws, smuggled a non-citizen into the 
United States, or was inadmissible when he entered the country. See id. § 237(a) (1), (2), 
(3), (5). An immigrant who leaves the United States might also be subject to the grounds 
ofinadmissibility. See INA §§ 101 (a) (13), 212(a). 
99 Martin, supra note 38, at 210. 
100 See id. 
101 See Susan L. Pilcher, Justice Without a Blindfold: Criminal Proceedings and the Alien De-
fendant, 50 ARK. L. REv. 269, 281-82 (1997). 
Mter the Immigration Judge has determined that the alien is deportable, he will con-
sider the various forms of relief for which the non-citizen is eligible. See id. at 284-85. 
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available to immigrants takes into consideration the factors described 
above, such as the length of the immigrant's residency and his ties to 
the United States.102 Thus, in the past, statutory relief has allowed for 
the equities of the situation to affect the outcome of a deportation 
proceeding. 103 
For example, "Cancellation of Removal A," previously § 212(c) 
"Waiver of Deportability," gives an Immigration Judge authority to 
cancel deportation for immigrants who have been lawful permanent 
residents for five years and have lived in the United States for seven 
years.104 Immigrants who have not attained five years of LPR status 
may be eligible for "Cancellation of Removal B, "105 previously called 
"Hardship Waiver." To qualify for this relief, a non-citizen must show 
"that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship to the alien's spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the 
United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence. "106 Although meeting this high standard is difficult,107 it does 
These forms of relief-which are affirmative defenses, as the non·dtizen has the burden of 
proving eligibility-are discretionary. See id. 
102 See Robertson, supra note 18, at 1035. 
10~ See Morawetz, supra note 28, at II O. 
Prof. Morawetz points out that with regard to the § 212(c) waiver for criminal activity: 
[t 1 he award of the a waiver depended not only on the nature of the criminal 
conduct, but also on the immigrant's life after committing the crime ..... 
This waiver process protected the interests of the immigrant who may have 
built a life of work, family and community based on the understanding that 
his or her past conviction would not lead to deportation. It also protected the 
interests of all of those whose lives were intertwined with that of the immi-
grant, including family members, employers and the employees of immi-
grants who operated businesses. 
Id. at 1l0-II. Although the immigrant's stake in remaining in the United States is taken 
into consideration, it is not dispositive. See id. The ImmigrationJudge also weighs the grav-
ity of the crime and the non<itizen's rehabilitative efforts. See id. 
104 See INA § 240A(a). The seven years only begin to accrue after the non<itizen has 
been admitted. See id. Admitted means that he must have entered after inspection and 
authorization by an immigration officer. See id. § 101 (a) (13). In addition, the immigrant 
must not have been convicted of an aggravated felony to be statutorily eligible. See id. 
§ 240A(a). 
105 SeeINA§ 240A(b)(I)(D) 
106 See id. The applicant for this relief must also show that he was physically present for 
10 years, has good moral character, and was not convicted on various criminal grounds. See 
id. Cancellation of removal is available to non-immigrants as well as permanent residents. 
See id. In addition, there are special rules, which are more lenient, for battered spouses 
and children. See id. § 240A(b) (2) 
107 See, e.g., In re Pilch, 1996 BIA LEXIS 37, *7-13 (BIA 1996); Matter of Anderson, 16 
I&N Dec. 596 (BIA 1978). Although both of these cases dealt with earlier versions of this 
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offer relief to some non-citizens who can demonstrate that their ties 
to the United States are significant. 
In addition to Cancellation of Removal A and B, an immigrant 
may seek relief through asylum. lOS Although a non-citizen may seek 
asylum upon entry to the United States, it is also a form of relief avail-
able to him in a deportation proceeding.109 Thus, an Immigration 
Judge has the authority to take into consideration the potential dan-
ger awaiting an immigrant who may be forced to return to his native 
country.ll0 
B. Changes to the INA and Their Effects on an Immigrant's Liberty Interest 
It has been argued that an immigrant's liberty interest is propor-
tional to his eligibility for relief since, as more relief becomes avail-
able, meeting evidentiary burdens becomes more difficult.111 While it 
is true that counsel is needed to help establish eligibility for relief, this 
reasoning assumes the outcome from the outset of the hearing.112 In 
defining the liberty interest by looking at the relief available to the 
immigrant rather than at the potential deprivation if he were de-
ported, one must presuppose that he knows what counsel, after thor-
ough research and investigation, would argue.113 In fact, counsel is 
form of relief where the standard "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" was lower, 
they do offer some guidance as to how this standard is interpreted. See id. 
108 See supra note 94-96. A form of relief similar to asylum is withholding of removal 
(also known as nonreturn or nonrejoulement). See 241 (b) (3); see also Sarah Ignatius, Asylum 
Law and Procedure, in UNDERSTANDING THE NEW IMMIGRATION LAw: How THE LAw AF-
FECTS IMMIGRANTS AND ASYLUM SEEKERS 147, 148-49 (Iris D. Gomez et al. eds., 1997). 
Withholding of removal prevents a non·dtizen from being deported to a country where he 
fears that his life or freedom would be threatened. See INA § 241 (b) (3) (A); Ignatius, supra, 
at 148. Like asylum, the fear must be on account of one of the five specified grounds. See 
id. Although the standard of proof is higher than for asylum, if the non-citizen is statutorily 
eligible, withholding, unlike asylum, is mandatory. See Ignatius, supra, at 149. 
109 See DEBORAH E. ANKER, 'filE LAw OF AsYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES: A GUIDE TO 
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND CASE LAw, 53-54 (2d ed. 1991). 
110 See supra notes 95-97. In addition, the IJ may grant other forms of relief such as 
voluntary departure which allows an immigrant to leave the United States voluntarily in 
lieu of an order of deportation. See INA § 240B. 
111 See Robertson, supra note 18, at 1035-36; Black, supra note 6, at 307. 
112 See Robertson, supra note 18, at 1035-36; see also Black, supra note 6, at 307. Black, 
in his argument for appointed counsel, argues that "the deportation respondent who pre-
sents a colorable defense to the charge of deportability would be provided with coun-
sel. ... " Black, supra note 6, at 307. He goes on to argue that, similarly, "the respondent 
would be entitled to the assistance of counsel if he could assert a colorable claim to the 
various forms of discretionary relief provided." Id. 
m See Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565,573 (6th Cir. 1975) (DeMascio,J., dis-
senting). In the dissent,Judge DeMascio criticizes the case-by-case approach for determin-
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needed to assist the client in determining which forms of relief may 
be available to him.ll4 Furthermore, if liberty interests are defined by 
the relief available to the immigrant rather than by the consequences 
of deportation, then recent changes to the INA made by the IIRIRA 
eliminating previously available forms of relief would have decreased 
immigrants' liberty interests.ll5 
Instead, the opposite has resulted: immigrants' liberty interests 
and their need for appointed counsel have increased. The IIRIRA 
reflected Congress' concern that the current laws were too lenient 
with regard to criminal aliens.ll6 Whereas non-immigrants can be de-
ported for various violations of their non-immigrant status,l17 immi-
grants, who have far fewer conditions placed on them, are subject 
primarily to criminal grounds of deportation. lls Consequently, the 
changes made by the IIRIRA to the criminal grounds of deportation 
substantially affect immigrants' liberty interests. 
Many immigrants have been affected by the IIRIRA's replace-
ment of § 212(c) waivers with "Cancellation of Removal."ll9 With the 
name change came substantive changes to the statutory eligibility for 
this form of relief.12o Section 212(c) barred relief for those immi-
grants who had committed an aggravated felony and who had served a 
sentence of five years.121 In contrast, "Cancellation of Removal A" 
places a bar on all aggravated felons, regardless of the length of 
time-if any-they serve in prison.122 
Although Congress clearly intended to take a "tough" stance on 
crime by removing some of the IJ's discretion to grant relief to many 
criminal immigrants,123 the changes made to the INA will produce 
exceptionally harsh results. Many immigrants who are convicted of 
ing whether appointed counsel is necessary because it requires the court to speculate as to 
what arguments counsel would have made before the ImmigrationJudge. See id. 
114 See id.; see also infra notes 250-51 and accompanying text. 
115 See generally infra notes 120-146 and accompanying text. 
116 See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, Title III, Subtitle B (Criminal 
Alien Provisions) (1996). 
117 For example, non-immigrant visas generally allow the non-citizen to remain in the 
United States for a specified amount of time. See INA § 101 (a) (15). A non-immigrant will 
be deportable if he overstays his visa. See id. § 237(a) (1) (C) (i). 
118 See generally id. § 237 (a) . 
119 Seeid. § 240A(a). 
120 See id. 
121 See Morawetz, supra note 28, at 11 O. 
122 See INA § 240A(a). This bar for all aggravated felons was first implemented by the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214 (1996). 
123 See supra note 122. 
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aggravated felonies may actually serve little or no time, signaling that 
the criminal justice system does not in fact believe that these immi-
grants pose a real threat to society.124 
The effects of the unqualified bar to relief for aggravated felons 
are exacerbated by changes to the definition of aggravated felony un-
der the IIRIRA and other immigration and crime acts. I25 Once a brief 
list of the most serious and violent crimes,I26 the definition of aggra-
vated felony now encompasses over twenty broad categories of crimes, 
some of which are only arguably serious or violent.I27 The IIRIRA did 
add such violent crimes as rape and sexual abuse of a minor to the list 
of aggravated felonies, but it also substantially lowered the sentence 
requirements and dollar amounts for many crimes that were already 
included. 128 
For example, a crime of violence or a theft offense, including re-
ceipt of stolen property, for which the sentence imposed is one year 
or longer, even if it is suspended, is now an aggravated felony.I29 Un-
der this definition, to constitute a crime of violence, the nature ofthe 
crime must "ordinarily present a risk that physical force is used," re-
gardless of whether the risk actually ensued. I30 Prior to the IIRIRA, 
crimes of theft or violence were not aggravated felonies unless a sen-
tence of five years or more was imposed.I31 Crimes relating to tax eva-
sion were not aggravated felonies unless the revenue loss to the Gov-
ernment exceeded $200,000; the IIRIRA reduced the amount to 
$10,000.132 ' 
124 To be deportable under INA § 237(a) (2) (A) (3) the non-<itizen must have been 
convicted of an aggravated felony. As discussed infra note 135, a conviction does not require 
that the felon actually be incarcerated. See INA § 101 (a) (48). Therefore, a felon with a 
suspended sentence may satisfY the definition of aggravated felony. See id. 
125 See Robert James McWhirter, HellJust Got Hotter: The Rings of Immigration Hell and the 
Immigration Consequences to Aliens Convicted of Crimes Revisited, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 507, 518 
(1997). The term "aggravated felony" was first adopted in 1988 and encompassed particu-
larly serious crimes such as murder and drug trafficking. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 7341, 7344, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469-71 (1988); see also McWhirter, 
supra, at 518. However, since then almost every immigration and crime act has expanded 
the list of crimes that are aggravated felonies. See McWhirter, supra, at 518. 
126 See McWhirter, supra note 125, at 518. 
127 SeeINA§ 101 (a) (43). 
128 See Daniel Kanstroom, Immigration Consequences of Criminal Procedures, in MASSACHU-
SETTS CRIMINAL PRACTICE 485, 507 (Eric D. Blumenson et al. eds., 1998). 
129 SeeINA § 101 (a) (43) (F). 
1:50 See Kanstroom, supra note 128, at 505 n.82. The sentence requirement must also be 
met. See INA § 101 (a) (43)(F). 
m See Kanstroom, supra note 128, at 505. 
U2 See id. at 506. 
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In addition to expanding the aggravated felony definition, the 
IIRIRA amended the aggravated felony definition so that it applies 
retroactively.133 The IIRIRA stated that the amendments "shall apply 
to actions taken on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, re-
gardless of when the conviction occurred .... "134 Thus, at the time of 
conviction, the crime may not have been an aggravated felony, yet to-
day it could be classified as such and may render an immigrant de-
portable regardless of the amount of time that has passed since the 
conviction.135 
This retroactivity provision substantially affects the liberty interest 
of immigrants. An immigrant may build his life in the United States in 
reliance on the fact that a plea he agreed to in criminal court would 
not render him deportable.136 The changes to the aggravated felony 
definition further affect the private interest of the immigrant because 
once he is deported on an aggravated felony conviction, he is barred 
from ever reentering the United States.137 Deportation alone is a seri-
ous deprivation of liberty; however, without hope of return, the con-
sequences are even more severe. 
The changes made to the INA have significantly affected the out-
comes of deportation proceedings.138 One commentator describes the 
deportation process: prior to the enactment of the IIRIRA, a non-
citizen who committed a theft for which he was sentenced to serve 
one year may have been deportable for committing a crime of moral 
turpitude if it was committed within five years of his admission to the 
United States.l39 Even if he were deportable, he may have been eligi-
ble for relief under §212(c).I40 If he did not qualify for this waiver, the 
Immigration Judge could have granted him voluntary departure.141 
\33 See INA § 101 (a) (43). 
rn~~ . 
135 See id. It is important to note that a conviction includes a judgment of guilt as well 
as a situation in which: 
(1) ajudge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty 
or nolo contendere or has admitted to sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and 
(2) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the 
alien's liberty to be imposed. . 
INA§ 101 (a) (48) (A). 
Consequently, plea bargains, which may be designed to avoid deportation, can be 
"convictions" under the INA. See id. 
136 See Morawetz, supra note 28, at 110-11. 
137 See INA § 2I2(a) (9). 
136 See Morawetz, supra note 28, at 113. 
139 See id. 
140 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
141 See supra note 110. 
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Even in the event that he had been deported, he may have been able 
to return to the United States some time in the future.142 Under the 
current law, the story is much shorter. The commission of a theft re-
sulting in a one-year sentence would be an aggravated felony.143 An 
immigrant would be deportable and would not be eligible for relief. l44 
Furthermore, he would never be able to reenter the United States.l45 
In sum, the immigrant's liberty interest-the first factor weighed 
in the Mathews test-is exceptionally strong. Deportation has always 
been a serious deprivation of liberty for an immigrant who has come 
to the United States intending to live here permanently. Congress' 
recent amendments to the INA have broadened the range of crimes 
that renders an immigrant deportable and, at the same time, has cur-
tailed forms of relief previously available.l46 In doing so, immigrants' 
liberty interests have been strengthened, thus triggering a greater 
need for procedural protection, particularly appointed counsel, to 
ensure that deportation proceedings meet the dictates of fundamen-
tal fairness. 
II. ERRONEOUS DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY 
Having established the significant liberty interest that is at stake 
in deportation proceedings, the Mathews test requires a determination 
of the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation of liberty.147 The test 
considers the hearing procedures currently used and their success in 
preventing erroneous deprivations.I48 If the current procedural pro-
tections result in a considerable potential for erroneous deprivations 
of liberty, it is likely that they fail to ensure a fundamentally fair hear-
ing.I49 However, the test also requires an evaluation of the probable 
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.I50 
Thus, to show the need for appointed counsel for immigrants, the 
142 See INA § 212(a) (9). Although non-citizens may be barred from r~ntering the 
United States for up to 20 years, previously removed non-citizens who have not committed 
aggravated felonies may be admissible. See itt. 
143 See itt. § 101 (a) (43) (G). 
144 See itt. 
145 See id. § 212(a) (9). 
146 See supra notes 120-46 and accompanying text. 
147 SeeMathewsv. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 313, 335 (1976). 
148 See itt. 
149 See id. 
150 See itt. 
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analysis compares a hearing in which the immigrant is unrepresented 
to one in which the immigrant is represented by counsel.151 
Before examining the nature of deportation proceedings and the 
procedural protections currently in place, it is important to note that 
several studies have indicated that representation in immigration pro-
ceedings does affect the outcome.152 In 1998 and 1999, the then 
American Bar Association President, Philip Anderson, encouraged 
members of the bar to provide pro bono services to immigrants, par-
ticularly those in detention.15S According to Anderson, "[1] awyers can 
make a difference. "154 In support of his contention, he writes, "Figures 
from the Government Accounting Office [(GAO)] show that asylum 
seekers with legal representation have three times the chance of being 
granted asylum as those without counsel. "155 
Historical evidence supports the GAO's findings. In 1961, Char-
les Gordon, then INS Regional Counsel for the Northwest Region, 
wrote that the "party [deportee] himself and the administrative proc-
ess as well could benefit from greater participation by counsel. "156 He 
cited a 1931 study that revealed that representation in exc~usion pro-
ceedings had a "marked effect" on the procedure and that "repre-
sented aliens prevailed in a far higher proportion of cases, since their 
counsel were much more effective in raising points of law, in ques-
tioning due process, in marshalling relevant evidence, and in advanc-
ing claims to United States citizenship. "157 
Neither the GAO findings referred to by Anderson, nor the re-
port cited by Gordon speak directly to the effect of counsel on the 
outcome of deportation proceedings overall,15S but these studies cer-
tainly suggest that assistance of counsel does help avoid erroneous 
deprivations of liberty. Admittedly, factors other than representation 
may have contributed to the results of these studies.159 Nevertheless, 
151 Seeid. 
152 See Philip P. Anderson, In Defense of Detainees, A.B.A.]., Mar. 1999, at 6; Gordon, su-
pra note 39, at 878-79; see also Margaret H. Taylor, Pr01TUJting Legal Representation for Detained 
Aliens: Litigation and Administrative &form, 29 CONN. L. REv. 1647, 1665-66 (1997); Cather-
ine J. Ross, Appointing Counsel in Civil Litigation, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1571, 1572-'-"'73 
(1996). 
158 SeeAnderson, supra note 152. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Gordon, supra note 39, at 879. 
157 Id. at 878. The study cited by Gordon was 5 Wickersham Commission Report 85 (1931). 
156 See Anderson, supra note 153; Gordon, supra note 39, at 879. 
159 Margaret Taylor points out that the higher approval rate for asylum seekers with 
counsel may be attributed in part to factors other than representation. See Taylor, supra 
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the studies are particularly persuasive when the underlying reasons 
for the impact of counsel in exclusion and asylum are considered. As 
noted earlier, counsel in exclusion cases is necessary for raising issues 
of law, collecting and presenting evidence, and advancing citizenship 
claims.160 Similar arguments have been made with regard to asylum 
cases,161 and the premise extends to deportation proceedings in gen-
eral. This Part will demonstrate how the attorney's ability to highlight 
legal issues and present evidence can affect the outcome of a deporta-
tion proceeding and thus lessen the chances of an erroneous depriva-
tion of liberty. 
A. Complexity of the Law and Process 
Recognizing the complexity of immigration law and the deporta-
tion process is integral to evaluating the probable value of counsel in 
a deportation proceeding.162 When the laws and procedures are com-
plex, there is a greater need for counsel to ensure that a just outcome 
is reached.163 Historically, immigration law has been recognized as 
complicated and confusing. l64 Even the courts have attested to this 
fact: one court described the INA as "second only to the Internal 
Revenue Code in complexity. "165 
A cursory review of the grounds of deportation provides initial 
evidence of the complex nature of the law.166 For example, the INA 
breaks the grounds for deportation into six major categories.167 
Within these categories there are parts, subparts, exceptions, and 
note 152, at 1665 n.62. For example, asylum seekers who believe that they have a strong 
claim may be more likely to seek private counsel. See id. Also, pro bono programs often 
screen potential clients and offer representation only to those with the strongest claims. See 
id. 
160 See Gordon, supra note 39, at 878. 
161 Even before exclusion and deportation proceedings were integrated into removal 
proceedings, there were substantive similarities between the two processes. Some waivers 
were available to non-citizens subject to both grounds of deportation and exclusion. Also, 
many of the grounds of exclusion are similar to (or even the same as) the grounds for 
deportation. Furthermore, procedurally, these hearings were very similar. 
162 See Black, supra note 6, at 302. Black writes, "The ability of an individual to repre-
sent himself must always be measured against the complexity of the legal proceeding it-
self." Id. 
163 See id. 
164 See Pilcher, supra note 101, at 269 & n.l; Black, supra note 6, at 302. 
163 See Castro-Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing ELIZABETH HULL, 
WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ALIENS 107 (1985». 
166 See generally INA § 237. 
167 See id. 
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waivers. Almost all of these various provisions encompass several ele-
ments.l68 
To further complicate matters, the statutory language alone is far 
from self-explanatory. Statutory definitions, regulations, and case law 
must be consulted to give meaning to the provisions.169 The criminal 
grounds for deportation provide a particularly convincing example of 
the difficult task facing a non-lawyer immigrant trying to understand 
the INA.170 For instance, in articulating the criminal grounds for de-
portation, the INA uses the word "convicted. "171 Although typically 
associated with a "guilty" finding, for deportation purposes, convic-
tions encompass dispositions other than "guilty. "172 The definition sec-
tion of the INA must be consulted to determine whether a criminal 
disposition rendered an immigrant "convicted. "173 
Immigrants placed in deportation proceedings now must take 
careful notice of the aggravated felony provisions in the INA since 
Congress has broadened the definition of aggravated felony and ap-
plied it retroactively.174 This task will be difficult for unrepresented 
immigrants, as the statute itself offers little guidance. Although the 
INA's definition of aggravated felony is a starting point, case law re-
search is necessary.175 
Admittedly, it is the IJ's responsibility to be knowledgeable of the 
current status of the law and to determine whether a particular con-
viction constitutes an aggravated felony.176 In many cases, the applica-
tion of the law will be straightforward. Over time, clear rules develop 
that are applied with little legal debate.177 Yet, inevitably, as changes to 
168 See id. 
169 See id. § 101. 
170 See INA § 237(a) (2). 
171 See id. For example, § 237 (a) (2) (A) (iii) reads: "Any alien who is convicted of an ag-
gravated felony at any time after admission is deportable." 
172 See supra note 136. 
17S See id. 
174 See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text. 
175 See INA § 101 (a)(43). The definition of aggravated felony lists over twenty broad 
categories of crimes. See id. The statute does not indicate in detail which crimes among the 
numerous state and federal violations actually fit into these categories. See id. 
176 See id. § 240(c) (1) (A); 8 C.F.R. § 240.41 (a). 
177 Case law has established definitions for many vague terms, such as "crime of moral 
turpitude," and the immigrant can generally rely on the Ij's proper application of the law. 
At least within each circuit, there are well-established lists of crimes that qualifY as crimes 
of moral turpitude. Yet even within this long-standing category of crimes, there is debate 
when the Service labels, for the first time, a specific criminal violation a crime of moral 
turpitude or when a change is made to the elements of a particular crime. 
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the law are made, legal ambiguities will arise, and the application of 
law will be called into questionP8 
The passage of the IIRIRA has magnified this problem for the 
unrepresented immigrant.I79 Questions as to the precise meaning of 
statutory changes to the INA have arisen among both scholars and 
practitioners. I80 As a result, legal challenges to the Service's interpre-
tation of the IIRIRA and the constitutionality of some provisions have 
ensued. I81 
Successful legal challenges have highlighted the increased poten-
tial for erroneous deprivations of liberty for unrepresented immi-
grants since unchallenged legal issues may result in unjust outcomes. 
A poignant example of the potential for erroneous deprivation of lib-
erty was the recent challenge to the retroactive application of the 
changes to the eligibility for § 212(c) waivers.182 
The IIRIRA's replacement of § 212(c) waivers with Cancellation 
of Removal denied relief to aggravated felons.183 However, many im-
migrants who had committed aggravated felonies, as now defined, 
also had pending applications for § 212(c) relief when the eligibility 
standards were changed.184 Upon the Attorney General's directive, the 
changes applied retroactively so that pending applications were dis-
missed and orders of deportation were executed.I85 In May, 1998, the 
Hrst Circuit Court of Appeals sustained a challenge to the retroactive 
application of the changes to pending § 212(c) waiver applications in 
178 See Taylor, supra note 152, at 1666. 
179 See id. Taylor points out that attorneys "focus attention on critical legal issues, such 
as questions of statutory interpretation (a function that is particularly important with the 
enactment of [the I1RIRA])." Id. 
180 See generally UNDERSTANDING THE NEW IMMIGRATION LAw: How THE LAw AFFECTS 
IMMIGRANTS AND ASYLUM SEEKERS (Iris D. Gomez et al. eds., 1997). 
181 See infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text. Another telling example of the un-
certainty of the constitutionality of the INA is the mandatory detention provision. See INA 
§ 236(c). As of September 30, 1999, 10 federal district courts had held that the provision is 
unconstitutional. 236(c) Scorecard, 4 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 1146, 1146 (1999). In addi-
tion, 20 other district courts have found that the provision did not apply on statutory 
grounds. Seeid. at 1146-47. 
182 See generally Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998); Goncalves v. Reno, 144 
F.3d 110 (lstCir.1998). 
183 See I1RIRA § 304. 
184 See, e.g., Henderson, 157 F.3d at 109-12. 
185 See id. (citing Matter of Soriano, Int. Dec. No. 3289, 1996 WL 426888 (Op. Att'y 
Gen. Feb. 21, 1997». 
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Goncalves v. RenO.186 The First Circuit held that pending applications 
should be adjudicated.187 
Although counsel cannot ensure that the IJ will interpret and ap-
ply the INA properly and constitutionally, at a minimum, it allows the 
immigrant the opportunity to advance complex legal arguments 
which he would not be able to do pro se.188 When sweeping changes 
are enacted, counsel is integral in helping to clarifY legal ambiguities 
that threaten to erroneously deprive immigrants oftheir liberty.189 
B. Presentation and Procedure 
Not only can attorneys raise issues of law, but their expertise in 
presenting evidence, eliciting testimony, and challenging due process 
grounds in procedurally complex hearings can significantly affect the 
outcome of the deportation proceeding.190 The Aguilera-Enriquez court 
failed to recognize the complexity of deportation proceedings in 
comparing them to probation revocation hearings.191 Probation revo-
cation proceedings are described as informal, non-adversarial, and 
flexible.192 The same cannot be said of deportation proceedings.193 
Although neither the rules of evidence nor the Administrative Proce-
dures Act (APA) rules for formal adjudications apply in deportation 
proceedings, these proceedings encompass many of the formalities of 
a trial. l94 For example, the proceedings are recorded, witnesses are 
given the oath, there is an opportunity for cross examination, and 
evidence is entered into the record.195 
The Service is represented by counsel, indicating that the gov-
ernment perceives a need for counsel in deportation proceedings.196 
The Service trial attorney puts the unrepresented immigrant at a dis-
186 144 F.3d at 113. 
187 See id. at 134. 
188 See Taylor, supra note 153, at 1666; Black, supra note 6, at 303 (noting that the "idea 
of seeking judicial review before the Circuit Courts of Appeals or by habeas corpus before 
the district judge, even if presented to the alien, will often be foreign to his experience"). 
189 SeeTaylor, supra note 153, at 1666; Black, supra note 6, at 303. 
190 See infra Part III.B. 
191 See Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 568 (6th Cir. 1975). Admittedly, the 
court does not specifically compare the procedures in a probation revocation hearing with 
those in a deportation proceeding, but it does cite Gagnon and adopts the case-by-case 
approach to appointed counsel. See id. at 568. 
192 See, e.g., Black, supra note 6, at 295-96. 
193 See id. 
194 See LEGOMSKI, supra note 23, at 540, 541. 
195 See INA § 240 (b) (1). 
196 See 8 CFR § 240.2; Black, supra note 6, at 295-96. 
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advantage from the outset.197 Professor Deborah Anker studied the 
role of Service trial attorneys in asylum cases.I98 She found that the 
trial attorney tended to attack the applicant's characteristics, focusing 
on "discover[ing] weaknesses in the asylum applicant's case by chal-
lenging the credibility of her testimony and written application. "199 In 
addition, the trial attorneys vigorously questioned the non-citizen in 
an attempt to point out inconsistencies in the testimony.2oo 
As Anker discovered, the applicant's testimony and demeanor 
during the hearing impacts the IJ's perception of the claim.201 IJ's of-
ten found that asylum applicants' testimony was "vague, unresponsive, 
and evasive.''202 Although Anker's study was limited to asylum cases, it 
seems likely that many immigrants in deportation proceedings would 
encounter similar "perception" problems, particularly when they seek 
discretionary relief or when the outcome of the case depends substan-
tiallyon their own testimony.203 In these cases, the immigrants would 
likely be subject to similar attack by the INS trial attorney.204 
The Service's adversarial position is consistent with notions about 
the proper role of an attorney as advocate.205 The adversarial system 
of law depends upon the zealous advocacy of an attorney on behalf of 
197 See Haney, supra note 45, at 184. 
198 See generally Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case 
Study on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment, 19 
N.Y.V. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 433 (1992). Professor Anker's study incorporated observa-
tions and data from 193 hearings in an Immigration Court "located in a major urban set-
ting." See id. at 443 & n.31. Interviews were conducted with hearing participants, IJs 
throughout the country, and other Justice Department officials. See id. at 443 n.32. 
199 See id. at 489. 
200 See id. 
201 See id. at 515. 
202 See id. at 521. 
203 For example, relief such as voluntary departure and cancellation of removal are 
discretionary forms of relief. See INA §§ 240A, B (stating that the Attorney General "may" 
order relief). Thus, in addition to showing that he is statutorily eligible, an immigrant must 
show that he merits such relief. See id. Although the Board of Immigration Appeals has 
outlined factors that should be taken into consideration when exercising discretionary 
powers, the IJ's subjective judgment of the immigrant's character will undoubtedly deter-
mine the outcome. SeeAnker, supra note 198, at 515. 
204 See Anker, supra note 198, at 494. 
205 Both the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and ABA Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility require that an attorney zealously represent his clients. See MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble, Scope, and Terminology (1997); MODEL 
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101 (1983). 
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his client.206 However, unlike the judiciary, agency adjudicators gener-
ally do not rely so strictly on the adversarial model. 207 
Historically, Immigration Judges have served the combined func-
tion of prosecutor and adjudicator.208 Through 1950, Ijs, then work-
ing within the service, would conduct hearings and investigate depor-
tation cases.209 Mter 1950, the Immigration Judges were no longer 
assigned to conduct investigations.210 They have, however, continued 
to play an active role in the hearings.211 According to the INA, the IJ 
shall "interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any wit-
nesses. "212 Although this judicial activism can be neutral,21!I in some 
situations, an unrepresented immigrant may feel as though he is be-
ing prosecuted by two attorneys rather than one.214 
With regard to asylum cases, Anker found that Ijs do sometimes 
affirmatively assist the applicants.215 Yet, for the most part, it appears 
that the goal of the Ijs' interrogations is to test the applicant's credi-
bility.216 Supposed neutrality of the Immigration Judge is thus thrown 
into question and an immigrant's response is undoubtedly effected.217 
Thus, although the independence of the IJs has been an impor-
tant step in protecting the liberty interests at stake in deportation 
proceedings, the retention: of the Ij's inquisitorial role has resulted in: 
206 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble, Scope, and Terminology; 
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIUTY DR 7-101. 
207 See, e.g. INA § 240(b) (1) (granting IJ authority to interrogate, examine, and cross-
examine the non-citizen and any witnesses) . 
208 See Rawitz, supra note 41, at 454-55. 
209 See id. at 454. When they were investigating cases, they were called "examining 
officers," and when they were conducting a hearing, they were called "presiding inspec-
tors." Id. Although the presiding inspector could not also conduct a hearing on a case he 
had investigated unless the alien consented, he could conduct hearings on cases similar to 
those he had investigated. See id. 
210 However, it was not until 1983 that IJs officially separated from the Service. See Dan-
iel Kanstroom, Hello Darkness: Involuntary Testimony and Silence as Evidence in Deportation 
Proceedings, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 599, 620 (1990). 
211 See id. at 619; Anker, supra note 198, at 496. 
212 INA § 240 (b) (1). 
m With regard to IJ's questions in asylum cases, Anker writes that "judicial activism 
can operate neutrally: a judge can ask questions which both test the veracity of applicant'S 
testimony and also assist her in developing facts which help establish her claim." Anker, 
supra note 198, at 496. 
214 See id. at 489. Anker observed that "the perception arose in many cases that appli-
cants faced two, instead of one, opposing counsels." Id. 
215 See id. at 496. 
216 See id. at 498-99. 
217 With regard to many discretionary decisions, the IJ's perception can be determina-
tive. See Anker, supra note 198, at 515. . 
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perhaps the worst of both worlds for the unrepresented immigrant.218 
Without counsel an immigrant may be unable to "conserve the advan-
tages of formality;" at the same time he is being subjected to interro-
gation by the IJ and other informalities that call into question the 
fairness of the hearing.219 Regardless of the legitimacy of an immi-
grant's claim or defense, his attempt to present, without counsel, a 
well-developed defense to deportation may be futile.220 
Part of this problem stems from the circumstances of the hear-
ings themselves. Testifying in a deportation proceeding can be frus-
trating and intimidating.221 One experienced trial attorney described 
the mindset of a witness in a jury trial: 
[M] ost witnesses other than experts or police officers have 
had no experience in telling their story in court, under oath, 
before judge and jury, knowing that some nasty lawyer for 
the other side is going to take shots at them in an attempt to 
destroy their credibility. 
The significance of testifYing in a courtroom under these 
circumstances is not lost on witnesses. They are apt to do 
strange things. They may become frightened, animated, pro-
fane, or quiet. They may sulk or exult. They may become 
snide, sarcastic, and mean-or too agreeable, pliable, and 
compromising.222 
Similarly, testifying in immigration court during a deportation pro-
ceeding can induce this same reaction from an immigrant or from 
other witnesses on his behalf.223 The gravity of the situation undoubt-
edly makes the immigrant more nervous. Furthermore, the immi-
grant in deportation proceedings may find himself in a unique situa-
tion in comparison to parties in other civil hearings; many immigrants 
face language barriers and a "lack of familiarity with [U.S.] institu-
tions," both of which exacerbate the apparent complexity of the pro-
218 See Black, supra note 6, at 303. 
219 See id. 
220 See id. 
221 See David H. Williams, What to Do When Your Witness Goes Haywire: Getting the Direct 
Examination Back on Track, mAL, May 1993, at 118, 118. 
222Id. 
223 See Anker, supra note 198, at 527. Anker points out that asylum applicants are "often 
overwhelmed by the unfamiliar and confusing atmosphere of the proceeding." Id. 
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ceedings.224 This context must be taken into account when evaluating 
the potential for erroneous deprivations of liberty. 225 
Counsel's thorough preparation and careful guidance through-
out the hearing can counter some of the immigrant's natural reac-
tions which may prove damaging to his case.226 Counsel's employment 
of standard witness preparation techniques can lessen the chance that 
the client will damage his case through testimony, and, instead, it can 
help the client to bolster his claims.227 These techniques include re-
viewing his testimony with him prior to the hearing, instructing him 
to remain calm, encouraging him to listen to the question and to an-
swer it completely and clearly, having him ask for a question to be re-
peated if it is unclear, informing him to remain silent if a question is 
objected to, and reminding him that expressions of emotion are not 
inappropriate as long as they do not show disrespect for the IJ or the 
proceeding.228 
Through direct examination, an attorney can remind the client 
of facts he may forget to relay if left to tell his story on his own. 229 
Counsel can also prepare the client for cross-examination.230 By re-
viewing the theory of the case and speculating as to what arguments 
and evidence the INS attorney will attack. counsel can best advise his 
client of what to expect.231 Counsel can also advise his client to answer 
questions with factually correct statements because "the witness 
should avoid trying to determine what the 'best' answer is. "232 
Perhaps most importantly, because counsel knows what factors 
the IJ will consider in making his decision, counsel is able to elicit tes-
timony and present evidence that will best support the immigrant'S 
claim.233 For example, if an immigrant applies for Cancellation of 
Removal, the IJ will consider the following factors in making a deci-
sion to exercise his discretionary authority: family ties with the United 
States, residence of long duration in the country (particularly when 
the inception of residence occurred while the respondent was at a 
224 See id.; Black, supra note 6, at 30l. 
225 See Anker, supra note 198, at 527; Black, supra note 6, at 30l. 
226 See Williams, supra note 221, at 12l. 
227 See BILL ONG HING ET AI..., WINNING 212(c) CASES § 8.4 (Supp. 1994). 
228 See id. at § 8.5. 
m See supra note 224. 
250 See HING, supra note 227, at § 8.7. 
231 See id. 
232 See id. 
233 Likewise, counsel is in a better position to make procedural objections throughout 
the hearing. See Gordon, supra note 39, at 878. 
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young age), evidence of hardship to the respondent and family if de-
portation occurs, service in this country's armed forces, a history of 
employment, the existence of property or business ties, evidence of 
value and service to the community, proof of genuine rehabilitation if 
a criminal record exists, and other evidence attesting to a respon-
dent's good character (e.g., affidavits from family, friends, and re-
sponsible community representatives).234 It is unlikely that many of 
these factors will be obvious to an unrepresented immigrant. Al-
though some of these factors can be proven without advance prepara-
tion, establishing other factors requires investigation and prepara-
tion.235 When possible, affidavits, letters, and documentation should 
be offered as proof.236 Counsel plays an important role in guiding an 
immigrant through the process of collecting documentation.237 
While many of the procedural protections currently do little to 
guard against erroneous outcomes for unrepresented immigrants, 
one potentially beneficial procedural safeguard is the requirement 
that the I] advise the immigrant as to any forms of relief for which he 
may be eligible.238 The Ninth Circuit has recognized that this re-
quirement places a "significant burden" on the 1].239 Upon review of 
the record, the I] must advise the non-citizen of any reasonable possi-
bilities of relief and give him the opportunity to develop his claim for 
such relief.240 
However, even the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has acknowl-
edged the limitations to this safeguard.241 In Moran-Enriquez, the court 
234 See In re C-V-T, Int. Dec. 3342, 1998 BIA LEXIS 11, at *10-11 (BIA Feb. 12, 1998) 
(citing Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581, 584-85 (BIA 1978». 
2~5 See infra notes 236-37. 
2~ See HING, supra note 227, at § 8.2. For example, in establishing rehabilitation, letters 
and evaluations from experts should be submitted as well as favorable parole or probation 
reports, evidence of academic achievement, and awards for community service or excel-
lent job performance. See id. 
237 See id. Counsel is particularly helpful where the non-citizen is detained by the Serv-
ice under INA § 236 and, thus, less able to collect documentation. 
238 See 8 C.F.R. § 240.11 (a) (2) ("The ImmigrationJudge shall inform the alien of his of 
her apparent eligibility to apply for any of the benefits enumerated in this chapter and 
shall afford the alien an opportunity to make application during the hearing."). 
2~9 See Moran-Enriquez v. INS, 884 F.2d 420, 423 (9th Cir. 1989). The petitioner 
claimed that he was eligible for relief, although he was unaware of this fact at his deporta-
tion proceeding because the IJ failed to advise him about his apparent eligibility. See id. at 
422. The Court of Appeals found that the record indicated, by inference, that petitioner 
may be eligible for relief. See id. Under these circumstances, the IJ was required to inquire 
further into petitioner's circumstances to find out if he was eligible. See id. at 423. 
240 See id. 
241 See id. at 422. 
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held that "IJs are not expected to be clairvoyant; the record before 
them must fairly raise the issue."242 Therefore, an IJ has no responsi-
bility to advise a non-citizen about forms of relief unless the record 
indicates that he may be eligible.243 Although the record established 
by an unrepresented immigrant may be sufficient to trigger the I]'s 
responsibility,244 in some cases it will not.245 Without the assistance of 
counsel to help build the record, to determine relevant facts, or to 
discern circumstances that indicate that the non-citizen is eligible for 
relief, an unrepresented immigrant will likely be unable to present his 
case fully and persuasively during a deportation hearing.246 
Furthermore, even if the IJ advises the non-citizen of the possibil-
ity of relief, there is no assurance that an eligible immigrant will be 
granted relief. First, cultural factors or fear of unknown consequences 
may prevent an immigrant from sharing personal, and perhaps pain-
ful, information with the IJ.247 Counsel, however, is in a better position 
to determine if his client is eligible: an attorney is more clearly "on his 
side" and over time can develop a trusting relationship that will facili-
tate this sharing of information.248 Second, as discussed previously, 
even if the IJ advises the immigrant about the possibility of relief, 
counsel is needed to help gather and present supporting evidence.249 
Finally, according to the court in Aguilera-Enriquez, the case-by-
case approach to appointed counsel provides additional procedural 
protection: If as a result of appearing unrepresented, an indigent 
immigrant is found deportable, the courts appoint counsel and re-
242 Id. 
243 See id. ("Until the [alien] himself or some other person puts information before the 
judge that makes such eligibility 'apparent,' this duty does not come into play.") (quoting 
Bu Roev. INS, 771 F.2d 1328, 1334 (9th Cir. 1985». 
244 M(jfan-Enriquez illustrates this point. The petitioner had been admitted to the 
United States on a visa available to immediate relatives of US citizens. See M(jfan-Enriquez, 
884 F.2d at 421. Based on this fact, the ImmigrationJudge should have explored the possi-
bility that the petitioner was eligible for § 212(h), which was available for immediate rela-
tives. See id. at 422. 
245 See infra notes 255-56 and accompanying text. 
246 See id. 
247 This practitioner's manual spends a whole section stressing the importance of 
building the relationship with the client and describing methods that will allow the rela-
tionship to develop. See id. at § 5. The book emphasizes the need to meet with the client 
numerous times both to build trust and to gather more information that will better sup-
port the case. See id. at § 5.2. Consequently, it is unrealistic to expect an IJ to serve as an 
adequate substitute. 
246 See HING, supra note 227, at § 8. 
249 See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text. 
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commence the proceedings.25o The Aguilera-Enriquez decision suggests 
that a court's review of the record to determine if counsel was needed 
will prevent erroneous deprivations of liberty and ensure the guaran-
tees of due process.251 However, this reasoning falls short of meeting 
the dictates of due process. 
First, it presumes that an immigrant who was unrepresented in 
his hearing will now be able to proceed in federal court. Second, as-
suming he knows to raise the issue of appointed counsel before a dis-
trict court judge, the court will review only the record that was made 
without the assistance of counsel. 252 This record will reflect all of the 
problems of self-representation that have been discussed previously 
and, thus, in most cases, will not be of assistance to the court in de-
termining how counsel could have affected the outcome of the 
case.253 As the dissent in Aguilera-Enriquez pointed out, relevant infor-
mation that may have affected the outcome of the proceeding will be 
missing from the record; the court cannot possibly speculate as to 
what evidence may have been brought forth by counsel.254 
Consequently, the case-by-case approach does not provide 
sufficient protection against the erroneous deprivations of liberty 
which inherently result when immigrants are unrepresented in depor-
tation proceedings. The promise of counsel for all indigent immi-
grants will, at a minimum, help the immigrant to understand the 
charges against him and help him to understand the hearing process; 
ensure that there is some investigation into possible defenses and 
forms of relief and that the immigrant is prepared to testify and pres-
ent supporting evidence; and explore the possible legal challenges to 
the applicable provisions. This step will provide a necessary safeguard 
against erroneous deprivations of liberty. 
250 See 516 F.2d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 1975). 
251 &e id. at 568-69. 
252 See id. at 569. 
253 See id. at 573 (DeMascio, J., dissenting) (stating that the m,yority's approach "sec-
ond guess[es] the record, a record made without petitioner's meaningful participation" 
and that the court should not "speculate at this stage what contentions appointed counsel 
could have raised before the immigration judge") . 
254 See id. Furthermore, the court rejected the notion that even in cases that appear to 
be clear cut-for example, a conviction for an aggravated felony (rendering an immigrant 
deportable and ineligible for relief)-the assistance of an attorney may reveal that the case 
is not so clear. See id. at 569. Although Aguilera-Enriquez held that the Service is not re-
quired "to conduct an inquiry into each potential deportee's criminal record to ascertain 
whether a post-conviction motion is likely to overturn his conviction," post-conviction re-
lief may be a viable option for some immigrants. &e id. at 571. 
2000] Appointed Counsel in Deportation Hearings 425 
CONCLUSION 
Although courts have rejected claims for a per se right to ap-
pointed counsel in deportation proceedings, the time has come to 
recognize that the promise of fundamental fairness-the touchstone 
of due process-cannot be fulfilled without counsel. The IIRIRA and 
other changes to the INA have made this painfully obvious.255 The 
severity of the new INA puts many immigrants, some of whom previ-
ously had no fear of deportation, in potential jeopardy of being 
forced to leave their lives in the United States-maybe the only lives 
they have ever known. 
With such a significant liberty interest at stake, the protections 
against erroneous deprivations of liberty take on great importance.256 
However, the case-by-case approach to appointed counsel does not 
adequately prevent erroneous outcomes, particularly since legal chal-
lenges and knowledge of the law can make the difference between 
remaining in the United States and being forced to leave, perhaps 
forever. 257 The foregoing assessment of the Mathews test factors--first, 
establishing a significant liberty interest and, second, the likelihood of 
its erroneous deprivation-supports the claim that due process re-
quires appointed counsel for all indigent immigrants. 
On the other side of this equation is the government's interest in 
not providing counsel. Undoubtedly, there will be a financial burden. 
But can that interest really outweigh the interests facing immigrants? 
The government has an even stronger interest: ensuring that constitu-
tional provisions are satisfied. Due process requires the utmost protec-
tion when the most important interests are at stake. Appointed coun-
sel for immigrants in deportation proceedings is an essential element 
of that protection. 
255See supra Part II.B. 
256See supra Part II.A. 
257 See supra Part III. 

